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ABSTRACT 
Informal investors' decisions are embedded in and influence by the institutional environment. This 
paper advanced a multilevel model on how institutional factors moderate the decision of informal 
investors. It is postulated that formal institutional factors (rule of law, regulation quality) and 
informal ones (social trust, institutional uncertainty tolerance) can enhance information flow, 
collaboration, and sanctioning mechanisms in a society; as a result, they moderate the importance 
of decision factors of informal investors. Multilevel modeling on data from 27 countries (over 
90,000 people) shows that the institutional factors heighten the positive relationship between 
individual's having start-up skills and informal investment, but surprisingly dampen that between 
seeing opportunity in new business and informal investment. These moderating effects are robust 
even after wealth, cultural values, and other factors are controlled. This study contributes to the 
research interaction of entrepreneurship and institutional theory. It also sheds light on the 
differential effects of improved institutions on informal investment. Different from most people 
would believe, improved institutions could actually cast adverse effects on informal investment, as 
smart, opportunity-driven individuals can have many other choices to put their investment. 
 
 1. Introduction 
The importance of institutional environment on entrepreneurship has received increasing 
attention in entrepreneurship research (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Bruton et al., 2009; Li and Zahra, 
2012). As Baker, Gedajlovic, and Lubatkin (2005: 500) claimed, “entrepreneurial behavior is 
motivated by a diverse set of motives and is strongly influenced by the social context in which that 
behavior is embedded”. The impact of institutions on key entrepreneurial activities has been 
investigated in various studies related to firms' innovation, venture capital investment, and high-
impact startups across nations (Busenitz et al., 2000; Cumming et al., 2010; Lounsbury and Crumley, 
2007). Institutions and institutional processes also shape entrepreneurs’ decisions to manage external 
relations - which suppliers to use, what partnerships to form, and from whom to obtain funding 
(Tobert et al., 2011). Among these relationships, investor relations are undoubtedly the most 
significant to entrepreneurs.  
In this study, we focus on informal investors (usually well-to-do individuals or retired 
entrepreneurs) for the significant role they play in financing early-stage new ventures (Knight, 1994; 
Shane, 2009). Informal investors provide early-stage funding and play an essential role in 
entrepreneurship activities (Knight, 1994; Shane, 2009). Availability of funding can determine the 
formation of new ventures (Cassar, 2004; Shane, 2009), and inability to secure funding hurts growth 
and survival (Aldrich, 1979; Baron and Shane, 2004). Furthermore, capital structure has a path-
dependent or imprinting effect on the design and development of new ventures (Cooper et al., 1994), 
and the kind of early-stage fundings used has a profound effect on the new ventures. Evidence showed 
that 53% of all investment in young companies in the US is from informal investors (Reynolds, 2007), 
exceeding other sources, such as venture capitalists, small business investment companies, banks, and 
other financial institutions. Without informal investors, many new venture would never exist or wither 
at the very early stage before venture capitalists or other institutional investors can get involved 
(Riding, 2008; Szerb et al., 2007). That is why OECD and EU have stepped up their effort to support 
informal investment due to its pivotal role in promoting entrepreneurship (Wilson, 2011). Despite its 
importance, informal investment is under-researched when the dominated research attention has been 
 on the founding, designing, and networking of new venture and venture capital.  
Prior research on informal investors mainly focus on individual qualities, such as demographics, 
resources, and values (Harrison et al., 1997; Mason and Rogers, 1996). However, as individuals and 
organizations are embedded in the institutional environment (Baker et al., 2005; Scott, 2001, 2002), 
their investment decisions are also largely embedded in and influenced by institutions (e.g., Bruton et 
al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2008; Meyer and Rowen, 1977). Given the research gap, this study aims to 
examine empirically how institutions influence informal investors’ decisions across nations. To this 
end we propose a model stipulating that both formal institutions (i.e., explicit and codified rules and 
regulations) and informal institutions (i.e., tacit and unwritten norms and values) affect individuals in 
making their investment decisions. As suggested in social capital and social trust theories (Hagen and 
Choe, 1998; Putnum, 1993), the key institutional factors affect information transmitting, cooperation 
facilitating, and sanction enforcement in the society and thus impact how informal investors make 
their decision. We tested the multilevel moderation effect of institutions (level 2) on the individual 
factors, having start-up skills and seeing start-up opportunities (level 1), across countries. The 
findings confirm most of our hypotheses, and further analyses show that they are robust against 
several alternative explanations.   
This paper contributes to entrepreneurship and institutional studies in three important ways. First, 
the decision-making process in informal investment research most often focuses on the individual 
characteristics of informal investors and the antecedents and consequences of investment decisions 
(Landström, 1995). We contend that institutions moderate the decisions on informal investment, and 
fill the knowledge gap on whether and how informal investors are influenced by institutions across 
countries. Second, the investigation of institutional influence on informal investment opens up a new 
avenue of research on comparative entrepreneurship. By explaining the mechanisms (see further 
below), this study highlights the influential role of both formal and informal institutions in shaping 
informal investment decisions. Finally, using multilevel modeling, we capture the cross-level 
influence of institutions on individual decision making in a multiple country settings (Hitt et al., 
2007). Such multilevel cross-country design can improve on previous studies (e.g., Kwon and 
Arenius, 2010; Traceys et al., 2011; Wong and Ho, 2007) in ascertaining their validity and revealing 
 more complicated cross-level institutional influences (Hitt et al., 2007). 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
2.1. Informal investors and investment decisions  
Limited personal financial capabilities and access to venture capital make more and more 
entrepreneurs turn to informal investors for funding to finance new ventures (Duxbury et al., 1996; 
Mason and Harrison, 2002; Prowse, 1998). Informal investors include those who have a close 
relationship with the entrepreneur (family and friends), and those who have no personal relationship 
with the entrepreneur (so-called angels) (Shane, 2009). Using data from 28 developed countries, 
Burke et al. (2010) found that entrepreneurial activities boost the supply of informal investment; 
however, their study did not look into other important institutional factors, nor moderating effects.  
Prior studies conducted in Western countries largely focus on individual factors relating to 
engagement in informal investment (Wetzel, 1981, 1983). These include psychological states, such as 
motivations of informal investors (Duxbury et al., 1996), and demographics and personal factors, such 
as previous investment experience and acquaintance with the entrepreneur (Bygrave and Reynolds, 
2004; Landström, 1993, 1995; Mason and Harrison, 1994, 1997, 2000; Maula et al., 2005). Recent 
studies pay more attention to informal investor's decision making (Maxwell et al., 2011; Mitteness et 
al., 2012) and strategy use (Wiltbank et al., 2009). Studies that involved non-Western countries have 
revealed a few consistent individual predictors, such as financial wealth, demographic and 
entrepreneurial background, and entrepreneurial control (Landström, 1993; Wong and Ho, 2007). 
Nonetheless, institutional effects, especially those across levels, remain a research gap in the studies 
of informal investment.  
 
2.2 Formal and informal institutions 
Institutions may be referred as formal and informal (North, 1990), both are related to investment 
activities, such as venture capital activities (Guler, 2007; Li and Zahra, 2012). We found that formal 
institutional factors– rule of law and regulatory quality (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010), and 
 informal institutional factors – social trust and institutional uncertainty tolerance (North, 1991; Oliver, 
1991), are most relevant to the investment decision of informal investors. These four institutional 
factors were examined for their function to reduce uncertainty and relevance to business transaction. 
Originated from different schools of thought (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
North, 1991; Scott, 2008), they can cross-validate the results of each other and thus serve as a good 
starting point for studying informal investment, and can explain cross-national difference in individual 
and firm behavior in addition to that of culture (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; Parboteeah and 
Cullen, 2003; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004). 
Formal institutions refer to the explicit and codified rules and regulations that govern property 
rights and transactions, reduce uncertainty, and solve problem (North, 1991; Scott, 2001). Rule of Law 
refers to “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Under the effective and impartial law 
system, informal investors can be more certain about the information they obtained, the other 
exchange party they work with, and the sanction mechanism if necessary. Regulatory quality captures 
“the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Regulatory 
quality is about the capacity of the government to effectively implement sound policies (Cubbin and 
Stern, 2006; La Porta et al., 1998). Since informal investment entails social and financial interactions 
among founders and investors, regulatory quality affects how informal investors go about doing their 
investments (Ho and Wong, 2005).  
Informal institutions, on the other hand, refer to the tacit and usually unwritten conventions, 
norms and values that shape social interaction (North, 1990). Social trust is an important societal 
norm that regulates and governs economic and social behavior, and enables social actors to establish 
mutual expectations of future behavior (Doney et al., 1998; Fukuyama, 1995; Luhmann, 1979). Social 
trust, in the sociological stance, is a socially embedded property of relationships among people or 
institutions (Granovetter, 1985; Zucker, 1986). Trust is critical when dealing with risk and 
interdependence (Rousseau et al., 1998; Stewart, 2004), which are the kind of conditions that informal 
 investors operate (Haar et al., 1988). Also societies vary in their societal institutions that guarantee 
members’ collective seeking of orderliness, consistency, structure, formalized procedures, and laws to 
sustain their daily life (De Luque and Javidan, 2004; Hofstede, 1991). Institutional uncertainty 
tolerance (House et al., 2004) captures individual's perception of a society’s practice of using rules, 
regulations and laws to enhance the predictability of future events and to avoid turmoil and instability 
(Venaik and Brewer, 2010). Uncertainty tolerance serves as a norm that influences business 
transactions, as it indicates how strong rules are used to deal with uncertainty in society (House et al., 
2004), and are found to reduce investment activities such as VC investment (Li and Zahra, 2012). 
Compared to social trust, it emphasizes norm backed up by the use of rules in society and has less to 
do with mutual expectations, even if it may result in such a consequence. Given its relation to dealing 
with uncertainty in society, informal investment is affected by this institutional factor.  
 
2.3. Institutions as moderators of informal investment decision 
Based on the literature (e.g., Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008; Bruton et al., 2009), we posit that 
individual factors of informal investors not only exert their influence on investment decision directly, 
but are also largely affected by the institutions. “Entrepreneurial behavior is motivated by a diverse set 
of motives and is strongly influenced by the social context in which that behavior is embedded” 
(Baker et al., 2005: 500). Past studies have revealed important decision factors related to the  motives 
of informal investors (Kwon and Arenius, 2010; Szerb et al., 2007; Wong and Ho, 2007). According 
to the human capital theory, individual's skills and knowledge are important human capital factors that 
influence their behavior (Becker, 1964). Therefore, this study focuses on two important human capital 
factors of informal investors, having start-up skills and seeing start-up opportunities, for testing the 
influence of institutions. These human capital factors of informal investors are also related to 
established factors explaining why entrepreneurs start a business (e.g., Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010; 
Kirzner, 1973), so gaining the insight of institutional influence on them would help build an integrated 
understanding of the entrepreneurial process (Baron and Shane, 2004).     
We propose that institutions would affect how informal investors are influenced by these decision 
factors in their investment decision, through three aforementioned important mechanisms: information 
 transmitting, cooperation facilitating, and sanction enforcement. First, good institutions facilitate the 
transmission and sharing of vital information in a society (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 1993; 
Seligman, 1997). Those who give credit to information from a variety of sources have a greater 
chance of becoming involved in better opportunities and “making a fortune”. Second, good 
institutions can facilitate individuals’ goodwill in social exchange relationship, reduce conflicts, and 
enhance cooperation (Sarasvathy et al., 2002). Thus, the spirit of cooperation is promoted while 
opportunistic behaviors are discouraged (Hagen and Choe, 1998). Third, good institutions facilitate 
the operation of societal sanction mechanisms that regulate the behavior of social actors (Hagen and 
Choe, 1998; Yamagishi, 1986). These three mechanisms are conceptually different but related to one 
another in their operation.  
 
2.4. Having start-up skills   
Planed behavior theory suggests that the stronger the control one perceives, the more likely one 
has the intention to perform the behavior (Ajzen, 1991, 2002). The extent to which individuals believe 
that they have the skills and knowledge necessary to pursue a specific task is an important 
motivational element required to achieve desired outcome. The sense of control not only fosters 
feelings of competence and accomplishment but it also affords investors with a greater degree of 
autonomy and power in deciding how to make their investment decisions; thereby increasing their 
ability to cope with any possible uncertainties. Informal investor are often interested in 
entrepreneurial activity, but do not want to do it themselves or have retired from running new venture 
(Bygrave and Reynolds, 2004; Maula et al., 2005; Scott, 2010). Informal investors do not merely 
provide funding to the new venture but also expect to add value to and involve in the new venture 
creation and development process (Mason and Harrison, 1997; Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2001). 
Thus, investors who have more skills, knowledge, and capabilities in entrepreneurial and venturing 
activities are more likely to have a higher level of control and may be more confident to invest as well 
as to contribute to the company (Wong and Ho, 2007). 
Hypothesis 1a: Individuals who have start-up skills are more likely to make informal 
investment.  
  
Investment decisions involve joint problem solving and cooperation among founders, investors, 
and other stakeholders (Sarasvathy et al., 2002). Conflicts and disputes can easily occur among 
investors and founders when they exercise control in working with each other. Institutions may 
facilitate joint problem solving by reducing uncertainty (Dequech, 2001; North, 1990), as they can act 
as a lubricant (Luhmann, 1979) to promote positive conflict resolution for the long-term prospect of 
cooperation even when differences emerge among investors and entrepreneurs. A good rule of law and 
high quality regulatory framework promotes individual’s faith in the government and society, and 
gives them the long-term prospect to work out differences with founders and together invest 
perpetually in start-ups. High social trust in society promotes shared moral values and mutually 
expected honesty by increasing openness, reducing conflicts, and facilitating joint problem solving 
and cooperation when disputes occur (Dyer and Chu, 2003). When trust exists, people would be more 
positive with relational exchange, thereby reducing risk and uncertainty in investment. In addition, 
individuals in a society of high uncertainty tolerance emphasize procedural consistency and formality 
in interactions with others (House et al., 2004), thereby reducing the chance for misunderstanding and 
conflicts. Practices that ensure a greater level of information, clarity, and control should be more 
desirable, making negotiation and conflict resolution more efficient. Thus, with benign institutions, 
individuals with skills to help new venture would find making collaboration easier and become even 
more interested to invest in new ventures. 
Hypothesis 1b: Institutional factors heighten the positive relationship between individual’s 
having start-up skills and making informal investment. 
 
2.5. Seeing start-up opportunities  
Informal investors make risky investments expecting for positive return (Van Osnabrugge and 
Robinson, 2001). They are facing similar decisions like entrepreneurs who start new companies 
(Hisrich et al., 2007). Entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 1973) is crucial to entrepreneurs, as new 
business venturing is preceded by a state of heightened alertness and capability to information. 
Informal investors who see opportunities may be said to possess "investor alertness", which would be 
 a state of heightened alertness and capability to spot profitable deals for optimizing the return of their 
capital and other resources (Maula et al., 2005). Just like entrepreneurs, they need to develop as a 
habit of scanning their environment for information that may solve unmet needs and to combine 
resources in a novel fashion (Busenitz and Lau, 1996) in order to capture investment opportunities on 
new startups. For potential investors then, having the investor alertness in seeing opportunities would 
make them more ready to invest in new businesses.  
Hypothesis 2a: Individuals who see start-up opportunities are more likely to make informal 
investment.  
 
Institutions, formal and informal, act as a lubricant to facilitate economic and social development 
(Luhmann, 1979). Specifically, high regulatory quality makes sure the laws are implemented 
effectively and are understood by people (North, 1990). People thus spend less time and cost on 
checking and monitoring entrepreneurs who give approvals and encouragement to invest (Cummings 
et al., 2010; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Social trust can reduce enforcement costs simply as 
individuals internalize the values behind laws and regulations. People in trusting societies engage in 
mutual monitoring, treat others honestly and give accurate investment and company information 
(Fukuyama, 1995; Yamagishi, 1986; Yamagishi et al., 1998). Lastly, uncertainty tolerance gives 
individual the confidence that rules are used to deal with uncertain situations related to investment (de 
Luque and Javidan, 2004), as order is in place and uncertainty is less likely.  
Overall, when good institutions prevails, the economy and society can benefit and many 
opportunities will arise (Zak and Knack, 2001). However, such lubricant may not benefit new 
business venturing only, but, as previous studies show, benefits established companies as well (La 
Porta et al., 1997). This creates the interesting situation regarding how people alert of investment 
opportunities would appropriate their resources. As Baker et al. (2005: 497) put it, “it is not the value 
of the opportunity, per se, that is most relevant . . . but rather the appropriable benefits − the portion of 
the value of an opportunity that a potential entrepreneur expects to be able to capture for their own 
purposes.” Accordingly, informal investors, similar to entrepreneurs, should try to capture value in a 
way that benefits them the most. In other words, individuals who see good opportunities will naturally 
 apportion their time and resources into established asset classes (e.g., mutual funds) but not just new 
ventures.  
Informal investing in new businesses may not be attractive enough to people in economies with 
good institutions simply because the better environment has facilitated the development and supply of 
investment products that carry lower risk and, discounting the transaction costs, provide a higher and 
stable return (Berger and Udell, 2003). In comparison, startups are usually less organized, uncertain, 
and risky. Besides, even if informal investment is attractive, it is unfortunately not commonly 
perceived as ‘proper’ practice (Meyer and Rowen, 1977), and that is why OECD governments try to 
facilitate and promote it (Wilson, 2011). Therefore, in an economy of good environment, people 
seeing opportunities in new ventures may simply act as what most smart individuals would do – tap 
into stocks and bonds instead of investing in new business startups. This means that institutional 
factors may weaken the positive relationship between seeing start-up opportunity and making 
informal investment. 
Hypothesis 2b: Institutional factors weaken the positive relationship between individual’s seeing 
start-up opportunities and making informal investment. 
 
3. Method 
3.1. Data 
We used validated data from several reliable sources. The individual-level data was derived from 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s (GEM) Adult Population Survey (APS), which have 
contributed to a growing number of papers (e.g., Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Estrin et al., 2012; 
Kwon and Arenius, 2010; Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010; Wong et al., 2005). In each country 
participating in the GEM APS, an academic team conducted a harmonized survey on a representative 
sample of adults (18-64 years old). To ensure adequate country numbers, we combined GEM 2007 
and GEM 2005 adult population survey (Levie and Autio, 2008). After matching the country-level 
data and deleting missing data, we obtained 93,552 individuals across 27 countries in total. The 
sample size ranges from 485 individuals in New Zealand to 20,823 individuals in Spain. We 
 compared the countries included to those excluded, and found there is no significant difference in the 
score of informal investor propensity for included countries (M = 4.30, SD = 5.302) and excluded 
countries (M = 3.44, SD = 2.21); t (38) = 0.733, p < 0.23. This indicates that there is no material 
difference between the selected and unselected countries, although the former group, which is 
composed of the major economic entities, has a slightly higher GDP and entrepreneurship level. 
Despite its wide coverage, we do need to caution that the GEM sample under-represents African and 
Middle Eastern countries. Other country-level data come from World Bank, World Values Survey 
(WVS), GLOBE study, the GEM Expert Survey, and Hofstede's (1991). The use of secondary data has 
both strengths and weaknesses (Au and Kwan, 2008; McGrath et al., 1982). We thus employed 
variables with proven validity, and strove to eliminate possible confounding effects by including such 
control variables as GDP, TEA, and cultural values. 
 - Table 1 goes about here – 
 
3.2. Dependent variable  
The dependent variable is the individual informal investment decision. It was measured by asking 
respondents “whether [you] have, in the past three years, personally provided funds for a new 
business started by someone else, excluding any purchases of stocks or mutual funds?” (1 = yes; 0 = 
no). As a recurring measure of informal investment propensity in GEM studies, this measure has been 
widely used in previous studies to identify informal investors (Bygrave and Reynolds, 2004; Maula et 
al., 2005; Szerb et al., 2007; Wong and Ho, 2007) and other management research, such as investment 
strategy (Holburn and Zelner, 2010), entrepreneurship (Davidsson and Honig, 2003), and new venture 
financing (Hallen, 2008). The average ratio of informal investors to total observations is 4.9%, with 
the largest ratio of 29.3% in India and the smallest ratio of 0.63% in Brazil.  
 
3.3. Independent variables  
The independent variables depict the focal individual attributes that lead to informal investment. 
Previous studies using GEM have used single items as proxies for focal variables, instead of full 
measurement scales. We used only measures validated in past studies (e.g., Levie and Autio, 2008; 
 Wong and Ho, 2007). Having start-up skills was proxied by asking the respondents whether they had 
the knowledge, skill, and experience required to start a new business (1 = yes; 0 = no). Seeing start-up 
opportunity was measured by asking the respondents whether they felt that there were good 
opportunities to start a business in the area in which they lived in the next six months (1 = yes; 0 = 
no). The dichotomous variables and single items may impose certain constraints because the use of 
secondary data does not permit as much flexibility and precision as the use of primary data but has 
been the practice, especially in a cross-national study with many countries pooled together and a large 
sample size in total (e.g., Parboteeah et al., 2008; Wanous et al., 1997). 
 
3.4. Moderators 
The national level moderators come from different sources. The fact that their results converged 
(see Results below) confer more confidence on their validity. Rule of law and regulatory quality come 
from World Bank Governance indices estimated by Kaufmann et al. (2007) . The World Bank research 
group claims that “Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised”. They are granted as the credible and precise measures of governance, used in 
various studies (e.g., Cumming et al., 2010; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). Among the six related 
indices, we focused on the two that are most closely related to our entrepreneurship and the informal 
investment context. The rest are related more to democracy and stability of society.  
Social trust comes from the World Values Survey (WVS). Trust is difficult to measure directly so 
researchers could only use indirect measure – indices or signals on the likely presence or absence of 
trust (Zucker, 1986). In the WVS, social trust is proxied by the percentage of individuals in each 
country who believe that others can be trusted as measured by the question, “In general, do you think 
that most people can be trusted, or can’t you be too careful in dealing with people?”  Measured as a 
percentage of population, it is not an individual-level variable, but a society-level variable that 
indicates the general level of societal trust toward others (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). It represents 
the attitude toward “most people” rather than that toward particular individuals, and makes no 
indication of the context, as even the most trusting individual will consider others untrustworthy in 
certain conditions (Uslaner, 2002). The validity of this measurement has been demonstrated in 
 previous papers (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; Kwon and Arenius, 2010), and similar measures have been 
used in the U.S. census and other academic studies (e.g., Blanchflower and Freeman, 1997; Knack 
and Keefer, 1995; Miller and Mitamura, 2003). We combined data from two waves of the WVS to 
obtain enough country samples (see also Kwon and Arenius, 2010), 24 countries from the fifth wave 
(2005-2007) and 3 from the fourth (1999-2001). To determine whether this combination makes sense, 
we selected 21 countries in both waves and found the trust measure to be strongly correlated across 
these two waves (r = 0.887, p < 0.001). As shown in Table 2, Turkey exhibits the lowest level of social 
trust (4.8%), and Sweden the highest (68.0%).  
For institutional uncertainty tolerance, we use uncertainty avoidance practices index from 
GLOBE as a proxy (Sully de Luque and Javidan, 2004) . The GLOBE study separated the practice 
and value measures for each of their cultural dimensions to capture both the tangible attributes of 
culture, such as the current policies and practices, and the intangible attributes, such as cultural values 
(Hanges and Dickson, 2004). The cultural practices measured in GLOBE are currently the only 
validated measures of descriptive norms (House et al., 2004; Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010). UA 
practices reveal people’s perceived orderliness and security in a society, whereas UA values capture 
people’s aspiration and desire toward social structure (Venaik and Brewer, 2011). Given the interest of 
this study to measure informal institutions, the UA practices index was deemed relevant (de Luque 
and Javidan, 2004). 
 
3.5. Control variables  
We employed several control variables at the individual and country levels. At the individual 
level, gender, age, household income, education, GEM wave and whether the respondents know 
entrepreneurs were used as control variables, as they have found to be related to informal investment 
in previous research (e.g., Bygrave and Reynolds, 2004). At the country level, we used the logarithm 
of GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) from the CIA database and the Total Entrepreneurship Activities 
index (TEA) from the GEM survey as control variables. GDP can affect an individual's investment 
decisions, as a country's wealth determines its level of investment activities and general institutional 
environment. The TEA index measures the proportion of a nation's adult population that is engaged in 
 entrepreneurial activities, including starting up a business or running a newly formed business. A 
country active in entrepreneurship should enjoy strong investment interest among its populace (Burke 
et al., 2010). In the subsequent tests on robustness, we also studied possible confounding effects 
cultural values, looking into cultural dimensions that are related to social trust and business 
transactions (Lim et al., 2004; Li and Zahra, 2012), namely power distance (PDI), individualism-
collectivism (IDV), and uncertainty avoidance (UAI) (Hofstede, 1991).  
 
4. Results 
Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) was used to test the multilevel hypotheses (Hitt et al., 2007; 
Klein et al., 1994). In using this approach, this study constitutes an advance on past findings with 
cross-country and multilevel data, as individual behavior is embedded in the institutional 
environment. Since our dependent variable is a binary variable, we employed logistic regression with 
the Bernoulli outcome variable in HLM. Table 3 presents the summary statistics and correlations.  
 - Table 2 goes about here - 
 
4.1. Hypotheses testing 
We estimated several HLM models to test the hypotheses. The four institutional factors are  
theoretically relevant to each other. In the analysis, we put them separately into the models (Crossland 
and Hambrick, 2011), although combining the four into one factor yielded the same results as well 
(see details later). 
A null model with no predictors specified was first analyzed. Then we added variables in a 
incremental manner, as shown in Table 4. Model 1 suggests that all two independent variables have a 
significantly positive relationship with informal investment decisions:having start-up skills (γ = 0.248, 
p < 0.001), and seeing start-up opportunities (γ = 0.173, p < 0.001). Therefore, Hypotheses 1a and 2a 
are supported. This finding therefore verifies previous findings in a multilevel setting. 
 - Table 3 goes about here - 
Level 2 institutional variables were added into the equation to test the existence of cross-level 
 moderation (see Models 2-4). Hypothesis 1b argues that the relationship between having start-up 
skills and informal investment decision are positively moderated by the institutions. The results in 
models 3 and 4 show a positive moderating effect of rule of law (γ = 0.079, p < 0.05) and regulatory 
quality (γ = 0.099, p < 0.05), respectively. The results in models 5 and 6 also confirmed the 
moderation effect of social trust (γ = 0.535, p < 0.01) and institutional uncertainty tolerance (γ = 
0.121, p < 0.01). Together, Hypothesis 1b received support.  
Hypothesis 2b posits that the relationship between seeing start-up opportunity and informal 
investment decision are negatively moderated by the institutional factors. The results in models 3, 4, 
5, and 6 show negative moderation effect related to rule of law (γ = - 0.060, p < 0.001), regulatory 
quality (γ = - 0.077, p < 0.001), social trust (γ = - 0.229, p < 0.05), and institutional uncertainty 
tolerance (γ = - 0.089, p < 0.001). Accordingly, the negative moderating effects of the institutions on 
seeing start-up opportunity received strong support. 
In addition to the foregoing results, a noteworthy finding is that the institutional factors do not 
exert a direct (or main) effect on informal investment decisions. Benign institutional environment 
alone does not seem to benefit informal investment directly. Further discussed below, this is in line 
with our argument related to hypothesis 2b; that is, a favorable institutional environment promotes 
informal investment, but it is far from the only business activity in which people can engage.  
 
4.2. Robustness of the moderating effects of the institutional factors 
GDP and TEA. Institutions are known to be correlated with several important country variables. 
It may be that the effect of institutions is spurious, and is caused only by correlated national variables. 
To rule out this possibility and establish robustness, GDP (Ln) and TEA were added to the model 
using their interaction with the focal variables, to see if they explained the moderation effects of the 
institutional factors. After controlling for these moderations, the moderation effects continue to hold 
up (Models 7-10 in Table 4). Thus, the moderating effects are unlikely the result of wealth and 
entrepreneurship activities. 
Single country effect. We checked whether a single country can affect the results. Among the 
data, India has a high ratio of informal investors to observations (29.3%) compared to the average 
 (4.06 %). After excluding India, the results remain to hold. Indeed, we tested that the overall findings 
are robust no matter if any one or two countries are eliminated in our tests.  
Cultural values. We reanalyzed the data by adding culture’s effect (both direct and moderation) 
with three individual characteristics into the model. Here, we employed three of Hofstede's (1991) 
cultural dimensions that are related to social trust (Lim et al., 2004), namely power distance (PDI), 
individualism-collectivism (IDV), and uncertainty avoidance (UAI). Country number reduced to 26 
due to the availability of the culture data. The institutional effects continue to hold despite the 
presence of the cultural dimensions. The former is not caused by these cultural effects. 
Institutional factors clustered as a theme. The institutional factors have relatively high 
intercorrelation for the reason that they share the similar underline function. Despite their conceptual 
differences, it may lend to the idea of clustering them into an institutional theme (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011). Following previous studies (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; Stephan and Uhlaner, 
2010), we used factor analysis to combine the four institutional factors into a second-order factor, and 
found that this factor exhibited the same moderation effects as the institutional factors.   
 
5. Discussion 
Institutions should shape not only the behavior of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, but also 
that of informal investors in new business venturing. This study focuses on how institutional factors 
(North, 1990), namely, rule of law, regulatory quality, social trust, and uncertainty tolerance practice, 
may affect informal investors’ decision. Consistent with previous studies in entrepreneurship and 
venture capital (e.g., Cumming et al., 2010), this study shows evidence that these institutional factors 
can moderate the decisions of informal investors, based on dozens of country data from GEM and 
other reliable sources. The findings extend past studies on informal investment and reveal the 
important role of institutions in shaping investment on new ventures. 
Firstly we found that individual decision factors, having start-up skills and seeing start-up 
opportunity, were positively related to informal investment decisions. The findings confirm previous 
studies (e.g., Maula et al., 2005) in a multilevel analytic setting, which controls for sample size 
 difference across countries and other country-level factors (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). This extends 
the external validity of previous findings conducted in a single-level of analysis. More importantly, 
the HLM analysis on multilevel data reveals that the institutional factors are systematically related to 
the weights of the individual decision factors of informal investment. The findings support that 
institutions reduce information uncertainty, facilitate cooperation, and make ease enforcement (e.g., 
Hagen and Choe, 1998; North, 1990); more importantly, institutions can exert cross-level moderation 
effects on informal investors’ decision that benign environment, as indicated by the formal and 
informal institutional factors, heightens entrepreneurially efficacious individuals to invest but 
dampens opportunity-alert individuals to invest in new business ventures.  
As the cross-level moderation effects show, while it is readily acceptable that benign institutions 
would facilitate competent and eager individuals to invest in new ventures, it is less obvious that such 
favorable context may divert opportunity-alert individuals to move their investment away to other 
more reliable and profitable asset classes. The explanation may be that on one hand, better institutions 
make available better investment channels (Bruton et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2008) and opportunities 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995; La Porta et al., 1998; Zak and Knack, 2001), and smart individuals 
certainly know how to appropriate their money for the best opportunities (Baker et al., 2005). Along 
this line of thought, what also deserved attention is that the institutional factors do not exert a direct 
effect on informal investment decision. We believe that this null direct effect is in line with the above 
argument. Although favorable institutions have a positive effect on economic growth and provide a 
benign environment for informal investment, a predictable, well-governed environment also facilitates 
other kinds of economic and business activities. These activities and opportunities compete for capital 
and other resources on investment to the best opportunities (Baker et al., 2005). On the other hand, 
“normative expectations and socially shared assumptions often drive organizational decision making 
and practices” (Tolbert et al., 2011: 1333), and people in general are socialized (Meyer and Rowen, 
1977) or “structured” (North, 1990) to see informal investment as more risky and less profitable than 
the conventional asset classes (Wilson, 2011). After all, conventional investment are asset classes that 
have been developed much longer and have legitimized themselves after years of development 
(Cumming et al., 2010; Shane, 2009).  
  
6. Implication 
Since institutions are found to moderate key individual decision factors, this study extends 
informal investment as an entrepreneurship behavior that is subject to institutional influence (Baker et 
al., 2005), similar like the cases of new venture creation (Aldrich and Fiol, 2007; Bowen and De 
Clercq, 2008) and venture capital investment (Bruton et al., 2009; Li and Zahra, 2012). The findings 
may shed light on directions for future research. First, it seems that good institutions (North, 1990) are 
useful to heighten confident and competent individuals to do informal investments. In particular, 
social trust and social uncertainty tolerance were demonstrated empirically as an important constructs 
for understanding entrepreneurship across nations (Fukuyama, 1995). The moderating effects of the 
formal and informal institutions are robust and unlikely to be the chance product of confounding 
variables, such as wealth and cultural values. The fact that the effects of formal and informal 
institutions converge may suggest that there is an institutional theme or second-order factor 
(Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010) related to uncertainty reduction that can 
affect entrepreneurial behaviors. It is intriguing for future studies to investigate into this possibility.  
In addition, while improving law and regulation is a prescription for almost every developing 
nation as a way to improve its economy, academics and policy makers may need to be careful with all 
the effects of improving institutions. This may sound paradoxical, but well-regarded policy initiatives, 
such as deregulations (Djankov et al., 2008), have been shown to be futile, if not detrimental, to 
nascent entrepreneurship (van Stel et al., 2007). And even though it may be an exception, poor 
institutions did not stop China’s new ventures from rapid development (Allen et al., 2005), and as the 
recent financial crisis revealed, the financial infrastructures of many developed nations failed to 
channel capital to the entrepreneurs and small and median enterprises. Hence, to informal investment, 
the findings of this study suggests that whilst improving institutions prompts individuals with 
entrepreneurial skills to invest in new ventures, such move may induce those who see opportunities to 
divert their capital away to other assets. This is because improving institutional environment is often 
accompanied by the upswing of the financial market. And financial institutions are more skillful to 
 use resources to develop investment tools, unfortunately not of them good, and persuade people to 
purchase them for investment (Davis, 2009). So future studies shall continue to ask the question of 
how to improve informal investment especially when there is continuous improvement in institutions. 
If more informal investment is useful, we may want to boost the entrepreneurial skills of potential 
investors in order to compensate for the deficit caused by better investment alternatives available to 
the investors. We need to do more to direct those who see opportunities to informal investment. Apart 
from presenting them with investment chances and establishing incentives to signal benefits (e.g. tax 
incentives), and supporting and building more angel business networks are suggested (Wilson, 2011). 
Future studies can investigate how institutions shape the emergence of new practices and new angel 
organizations (Sine et al., 2005). In any case, if increasing informal investment is important, we need 
to be aware of differential effects brought about by improving institutions and find ways to counter-
balance them.  
Although the findings of this study are interesting, several limitations should be noted when 
interpreting the results and can direct to future research improvement. First, informal investment at 
the population level is a relatively rare event, though not serious. Yet, according to King and Zeng 
(2001a, 2001b), the rare events issue makes the results less significant than they really are; thus 
producing conversative results. We did not deal with this issue further, as the results of our hypothesis 
testing are strong, and there are no good methods for studies with a multilevel category variable 
design. Future studies shall continue to take note of the rare event issue and may find a good way of 
overcoming this limitation. Second, the dichotomous variables used to measure informal investment 
reveal only the propensity to invest or not invest. Future analysis of more sophisticated measures 
would help us to better understand informal investment. The same improvement also applies to the 
independent variables and may help to extend the study to cover other relevant constructs, such as 
networks of entrepreneurs (e.g., Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986) and family trust (Miller and Mitamura, 
2003).  
Third, to capture global entrepreneurial activity, the breadth and depth of measurement is limited 
in the GEM project. Most of the predictors used in our study are dichotomous for the practical reason 
that it would be prohibitively expensive to collect more fine-grained data across dozens of countries 
 (Maula et al., 2005). Possible confounding variables could be tested in more fine-tuned surveys and 
through case studies. Single-item measure variables are always subject to criticism. However, when 
the situational constraints limit the use of scales to the research questions, the employment of single-
item measures is acceptable (Wanous et al., 1997). Our use of only those measures that have been 
proven in past studies (e.g., Kwon and Arenius, 2010) may alleviate the problem to a certain extent. 
Lastly, the cross-sectional data do not allow causality to be clearly determined. It may be helpful since 
we do provide good theoretical reasoning for the identified relationships. Yet future studies could use 
a longitudinal or experimental design and a different institutional context (e.g., Bercovitz and 
Feldman, 2008) to verify the results.  
To conclude, institutions are found to intersect with entrepreneurship in informal investment in 
addition to venture capital (Li and Zahra, 2012). This study focuses on national institutional factors 
and its interaction with individual qualities and decision factors. It is hoped that future studies 
continues to explore other institutions related to organization, class, industry and certainly other 
microfoundations of entrepreneurship (Zahra and Wright, 2011).  
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Table 1 List of the 27 countries a 
 
 GEM country 
category (income) b 
Investor 
% 
Legality 
Quality  
Social Trust UAIP TEA
% 
GDP PPP  
international  
$ Billion 
Total Number 
of respondents 
Argentina    Middle&Low 2 3.68 -1.34 0.17 3.65 11.95 471.25 1607 
Austria High 3.04 1.08 0.48 4.39 10.9 696.83 1057 
Brazil     Middle&Low 2 0.63 -1.05 0.09 3.6 12.0 1712.79 2558 
China   Middle&Low 1 7.64 -1.01 0.52 4.94 15.05 6208.89 2523 
Colombia Middle&Low 2 6.33 -0.92 0.14 3.57 22.7 344.09 1489 
Finland   High  3.31 1.13 0.59 5.02 5.95 173.83 1544 
France High 4.72 0.67 0.19 4.43 4.3 352.01 2688 
Germany High 2.28 0.98 0.34 5.19 5.4 2587.68 2746 
Hong Kong      High 6.90 1.14 0.41 4.32 10.0 268.20 1032 
India      Middle&Low 1 29.3 -0.88 0.23 4.15 8.5 2772.52 616 
Israel      High 1.85 0.34 0.23 4.01 5.4 177.27 851 
Italy      High 2.34 -0.28 0.29 3.79 4.95 1744.76 1181 
Japan    High 1.22 0.57 0.39 4.07 3.25 4085.18 1456 
Mexico Middle&Low 2 3.83 -0.82 0.16 4.18 5.9 1394.17 1607 
Netherlands High 1.84 1.10 0.44 4.7 4.8 609.78 2723 
New Zealand High 4.24 1.07 0.51 4.75 17.6 102.84 485 
Russia  Middle&Low 1 1.46 -1.49 0.27 2.88 2.7 1896.62 1161 
Slovenia  High 2.44 0.09 0.18 3.78 4.6 50.19 2377 
South Africa Middle&Low 1 1.67 -0.41 0.17 4.34 5.1 433.29 1603 
Spain  High 2.96 0.34 0.20 3.97 6.65 1298.69 20823 
Sweden    High 2.23 1.15 0.68 5.32 4.1 314.12 2692 
Switzerland   High 4.18 1.17 0.51 5.175 6.2 289.38 3522 
Thailand   Middle&Low 1 5.15 -0.70 0.42 3.93 23.8 482.91 3308 
Turkey       Middle&Low 1 4.50 -0.63 0.05 3.63 5.6 859.99 1067 
United Kingdom  High 1.20 1.06 0.30 4.65 5.85 2051.41 17784 
United States  High 4.51 0.86 0.39 4.15 11.0 13052.85 1960 
Venezuela Middle&Low 2 2.66 -2.30 0.16 3.44 22.6 299.09 1508 
 
 
a Countries are in alphabetical order. 
b GEM divide countries into: high-income countries; middle- and low-income 1 countries (Europe 
and Asia); middle and low-income 2 countries (Latin America and Caribbean). 
 Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations a 
 
a Number of Individuals = 93552; Number of Countries =27. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Means s.d.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Level 1 variables                 
1.Having start-up skills 0.40 0.49               
2.Seeing start-up opportunities 0.40 0.49 0.220              
3.Gender 0.51        0.50 -0.080 -0.118             
4.Age 4121       13.9 -0.073 -0.151 0.008            
5.Income  0.93 0.79 0.084 0.120 -0.089 -0.049           
6.Education 1.40 0.49 0.040 0.084 -0.028 -0.060 0.235          
7.GEM Wave 0.61 .0.49 0.039 0.011 0.010 -0.029 0.004 0.083         
8.Knowing Entrepreneur 0.53 0.50 0.230 0.258 -0.151 -0.035 0.122 0.078 0.010        
9.Investment 0.05 0.21 0.073 0.152 -0.057 -0.019 0.058 0.042 0.010 0.098       
Level 2 variables                 
10.TEA 9.14 6.19               
11.GDP (Ln) 2.87 0.56          -0.116     
12.Rule of Law 0.69 1.03          0.006 0.046    
13.Regulatory Quality 0.82 0.56          -0.418 0.040 0.952   
14.Trust 0.31 0.17          -0.024 0.132 0.628 0.572  
15.Uncertainty Tolerance 4.22 0.60          -0.211 0.029 0.733 0.656 0.729 
  
Table 3  Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for Informal Investment Decisions a  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Level-1 Effect           
Intercept  -2.679(0.125)*** -2.682(0.121)*** -2.674(0.123)*** -2.677(0.121)*** -2.677(0.121)*** -2.677(0.121)*** -2.640(0.117)*** -2.641(0.114)***     -2.647(0.117)*** -2.648(0.117)*** 
Income  0.182(0.013)*** 0.182(0.013)*** 0.181(0.012)*** 0.181(0.012)*** 0.180(0.018)*** 0.180(0.012)*** 0.176(0.012)*** 0.176(0.012)*** 0.177(0.012)*** 0.177(0.012)*** 
Education 0.092(0.018)*** 0.092(0.018)*** 0.091(0.017)*** 0092(0.017)*** 0.092(0.017)*** 0.091(0.018)*** 0.089(0.017)*** 0.089(0.017)*** 0.091(0.017)*** 0.089(0.017)*** 
Gender -0.159(0.014)*** -0.159(0.014)*** -0.159(0.013)*** -0.159(0.015)*** -0.159(0.013)*** -0.158(0.013)*** -0.155(0.013)*** -0.156(0.013)*** -0.156(0.013)*** -0.155(0.013)*** 
Age 0.004(0.001)*** 0.004(0.001)*** 0.004(0.001)*** 0.004(0.001)*** 0.004(0.001)*** 0.004(0.001)*** 0.004(0.001)*** 0.004(0.001)*** 0.004(0.001)*** 0.004(0.001)*** 
GEM wave -0.072(0.087)* -0.071(0.036)* -0.069(0.036)+ -0.070(0.036)* -0.067(0.037)+ -0.068(0.036)+ -0.068(0.034)* -0.069(0.034)* -0.065(0.035)+ 0.067(0.035)+ 
Knowing Entrepreneur 0.574(0.044)*** 0.571(0.043)*** 0.555(0.045)*** 0.561(0.042)*** 0.558(0.043)*** 0.564(0.045)*** 0.522(0.042)*** 0.529(0.038)*** 0.525(0.042)*** 0.529(0.043)*** 
Having start-up skills 0.248(0.033)*** 0.245(0.031)*** 0.254(0.029)*** 0.267(0.027)*** 0.241(0.028)*** 0.229(0.028)*** 0.234(0.030)*** 0.242(0.027)*** 0.234(0.028)*** 0.224(0.030)*** 
Seeing start-up opportunities 0.173(0.015)*** 0.169(0.015)*** 0.165(0.015)*** 0.159(0.014)*** 0.174(0.013)*** 0.180(0.013)*** 0.164(0.015)*** 0.153(0.014)*** 0.173(0.013)*** 0.184(0.013)*** 
           
Level-2 Effect           
TEA  0.029(0.016)+ 0.040(0.014)* 0.040(0.016)* 0.029(0.016)+ 0.031(0.015)* 0.019(0.008)* 0.011(0.014) 0.017(0.007)* 0.020(0.007)** 
GDP (Ln)  0.132(0.179) 0.149(0.1795) 0.120(0.162) 0.120(0.162) 0.142(0.163) 0.273(0.201) 0.243(0.169) 0.265(0.212) 0.265(0.213) 
Rule of Law    0.069(0.094)    0.022(0.080)    
Regulatory Quality    -0.023(0.211)    -0.102(0.200)   
Trust     -0.085(0.447)    -0.081(0.400)  
Uncertainty Tolerance      0.137(0.075)+    0.114(0.078) 
           
Cross-level Moderation 
Rule of Law ×  
Having start-up skills 
  0.063(0.027)*    0.048(0.026)+    
Rule of Law ×  
Seeing start-up opportunities 
  -0.060(0.016)***    -0.079(.023)**    
Regulatory Quality ×  
Having start-up skills 
   0.099(0.037)*    0.086(0.037)*   
Regulatory Quality ×  
Seeing start-up opportunities 
   -0.077(0.017)***    -0.097(0.025)***   
Trust ×  
Having start-up skills 
    0.535(0.177)**    0.535(0.177)**  
  
 
a Number of Individuals = 93552; Number of Countries =27. 
+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
Trust ×  
Seeing start-up opportunities 
    -0.229(0.090)*    -0.224(0.089)*  
Uncertainty Tolerance×  
Having start-up skills 
     0.121(0.039)**    0.095(0.049)+ 
Uncertainty Tolerance×  
Seeing start-up opportunities 
     -0.089(0.024)***    -0.091(0.026)** 
           
TEA × 
Having start-up skills 
      -0.005(0.004) -0.003(0.004) -0.008(0.003)* -0.005(0.004) 
TEA × 
Seeing start-up opportunities 
      -0.005(0.004) -0.004(0.003) -0.002(0.001)* -0.001(0.002) 
LnGDP × 
Having start-up skills 
      0.071(0.056) 0.081(0.054) 0.052(0.048) 0.045(0.052) 
LnGDP × 
Seeing start-up opportunities 
      -0.007(0.037) -0.003(0.036) 0.017(0.035) 0.024(0.031) 
           
Pseudo R2 
(Incremental) 
18.4% 30.48& 38.53% 36.09% 30.06% 34.99% 39.59% 33.66% 37.42% 35.24% 
